Strategic Forecasting: Falun Gong's New Campaign Sparks Beijing's Old Fears

Members of the Falun Gong spiritual group have hacked into Chinese TV broadcasts in six different cities over the past six months. This tactic attempts to counter the government's anti-Falun Gong propaganda, and it may signal the start of a new phase in the battle between the group and the government -- one that could pose a bigger threat to the Communist Party if the country's urban unemployed rise up in support of the group.

Analysis

Members of the Falun Gong spiritual group reportedly hacked into Chinese government television broadcasts in Yantai, Shandong province, and briefly aired a message June 25 that said "Falun Gong is good." The incident was the latest in a string of broadcast hijackings by the Falun Gong that have hit six cities in six months, primarily in the country's north-eastern "rust belt," where unemployment and labour unrest are endemic.

The group is trying to counter the government's massive anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign, which centres on the January 2001 self-immolation attempt by a group of alleged followers in which two died [CH Editors’ note: This was an incident staged by the Jiang regime to discredit Falun Gong.]. The new tactic reveals the group's technological savvy and may point to a shift in the group's focus. Given that most of the Falun Gong broadcasts focused on China's north east, the group may be laying the groundwork for a new showdown with the government, one that could draw on the ranks of disgruntled urban unemployed.

By [tapping] into state television to take its case directly to the people, the Falun Gong is directly contradicting and confronting China's central leadership. This is a new strategy for a group that has thus far used peaceful demonstrations, appeals for dialogue and attention from foreign media and non-governmental organizations to try to convince Beijing to lift its ban on the group.

But these tactics have shown limited success, and Beijing is unlikely to reverse its decision. The government's inability to crush the group has only reinforced Beijing's perception that the Falun Gong is a threat to its authority. Although the group simply could have moved underground and practiced quietly after the government outlawed it in 1999, it instead chose to fight for its rights -- which has led it down the current path toward confrontation.

The Falun Gong first emerged [...] in the early 1990s. It spread rapidly and across socio-economic classes, filling a spiritual void in China in a time of rapid change. Its appeal was not surprising, as it played on a long tradition of Taoist, Buddhist and Qi Gong groups and philosophies.

In April 1999, after a run-in with a local government, the Falun Gong confronted Beijing directly in one of the most impressive displays of civil action in China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. More than 10,000 followers converged along the street outside the government compound in Beijing and held a daylong silent vigil. This Gandhi-inspired peaceful demonstration, which faded quietly into the night, had precisely the opposite effect on the Chinese government [...].

Rather than persuade China's leaders to legitimise the group, the incident sparked fear among the country's elite. [...] After brief confusion, Beijing banned the group and began a massive crackdown, including rounding up and detaining thousands of Falun Gong supporters.

The Falun Gong quickly adjusted its tactics and began to appeal for international help. It turned to foreign supporters and drew international media attention [...]. Chinese Falun Gong practitioners began appearing in Tiananmen Square, holding banners and signs in peaceful protest. The crackdown by Chinese security forces that followed was captured on foreign cameras and broadcast worldwide.

[...]

[...] Falun Gong altered its strategy. Foreigners, rather than Chinese followers, in Tiananmen Square, increasingly carried out protests. Also, wherever the Chinese leaders travelled in Europe or Asia, supporters of the Falun Gong were there.

In January 2002, the Falun Gong began its new tactic of [tapping into] government television. The first incident took place Jan. 1 in Chongqing, Sichuan province, and was followed a month later on Feb. 16 in Anshan, Liaoning. In Anshan, three Falun Gong activists tapped into the local cable line but were caught in the process, and security forces shot at least one.

On March 5, Falun Gong activists managed to [tapped] into eight channels in Changchun, Jilin province, the hometown of Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi. They broadcast two 20-minute films contradicting the self-immolation story and extolling the virtues of the Falun Gong. On April 21, they struck in Harbin, Heilongjiang province, reportedly airing pro-Falun Gong material for more than an hour.

The two most recent cases, on June 21 in Laiyang and on June 25 in Yantai, both in Shandong province, were shorter broadcasts, simply relaying the message that "Falun Gong is good." But in these cases, rather than [tapping] into cable lines, the Falun Gong managed to [tap into the] government satellite broadcasts -- according to Chinese security officials cited by the South China Morning Post -- something quite a bit more sophisticated than splicing a VCR into cable lines.