WSJ: Jiang Clings to His Throne

By WEN HUANG and CHEN XIAOPING

Major Business News
August 1, 2002

Throughout the past decade, Chinese President Jiang Zemin has used the need for stability in China as an excuse for everything from suppressing worker unrest to the crackdown against the spiritual Falun Gong movement.

Yet one crucial element in ensuring stability in any country consists of institutionalized structures for transferring power from one leader to the next. And it is here that there are disturbing signs that Mr. Jiang, who is
now 76, is about to defy his own rhetoric, apparently because he has got so comfortable with his emperor's chair that he is having a hard time letting go.

Until now, China has been slowly moving away from a system dominated by octogenarian politics. Under former leader Deng Xiaoping, the Communist Party introduced an unwritten rule that senior leaders should retire at the age of 70 to make room for younger and more energetic leaders and pave the way for a smooth, power succession in China.

Deng stepped down from all formal positions of power several years before his death, although he continued to wield considerable influence behind the scenes. And Mr. Jiang didn't seem to have any problem applying this rule when it came to other senior leaders. In 1997, Qiao Shi stepped down as chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee -- China's top legislative body -- and exited from politics at the age of 73, amid widespread suggestions he had been forced from power by Mr. Jiang, his former rival.

But, speaking to foreign journalists, the Chinese president denied that Mr. Qiao's departure had anything to do with his age. And in July 1999, while meeting with former Japanese Prime Minster Keizo Obuchi, Mr. Jiang insisted there was no age limit to the position of the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, which he also holds.

Now there is growing speculation among China watchers that this fall's 16th Communist Party Congress, which had been expected to map out the succession plan for a fourth generation of Chinese leaders, will instead see Mr. Jiang cling on to his positions as party chief and head of the Chinese military. His cronies have wasted no time in launching an aggressive campaign to support such ambitions, with many of Mr. Jiang's allies in the Chinese provinces writing letters to the Central Party Committee, pledging their loyalty and begging him to stay.

At the beginning of this year, Fu Quanyou, chief of staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, called on the military to unite unconditionally under the banner of Mr. Jiang's leadership. In July, in a speech given to
the military staff in Shaanxi province, Zhang Wannian, the vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission emphasized that implementing Mr. Jiang's political theories should be the top priority of the armed forces and called on all military officers and soldiers to follow the orders of Mr. Jiang and the Central Party Committee. At a time when the leadership of the party is in transition, the intention behind such remarks is obvious.

Mr. Jiang's allies have come up with numerous justifications for remaining in office. They argue that Mr. Jiang has established himself within the military whereas the new leader may have problems commanding the respect of army officers; that China is facing serious problems of unemployment and labour unrest and that Mr. Jiang's continued leadership will help maintain stability. They also argue that Mr. Jiang's statesmanship is needed in the light of the more hostile policy being pursued towards China by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush.

In summary, their argument is that Hu Jintao, the heir apparent, is still immature and needs Mr. Jiang's continued guidance. But the 60-year-old Mr. Hu, who was handpicked by Deng as Mr. Jiang's successor, has already been groomed for the top party and military jobs for the past 12 years. He has extensive leadership experience both at local and national levels, having served as head of the Chinese Communist Youth League, China's youngest provincial party boss in the south-western province of Guizhou and the first non-military party chief of Tibet. For the past four years, he has been vice president of China and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission.

In other words, it is not that Mr. Hu lacks experience and needs help. Rather, it is that Mr. Jiang doesn't want to step down and so needs help in finding excuses to stay on. His cronies have read the mind of their master, and so are orchestrating a propaganda campaign to garner public support for Mr. Jiang remaining in office.

The current situation has strong parallels with another power-hungry Chinese leader -- Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), the Napoleonesque general and politician who became provisional president after the Chinese Revolution of 1911 led to the end of imperial rule and the abdication of the last emperor, the young Pu Yi, in February 1912. Within a few months, he had suspended parliament and the provincial assemblies and forced the promulgation of a new constitution, which, in effect, made him president for life. Still not satisfied with this, in late 1915 Yuan convened a special Representative Assembly, whose members -- handpicked by him -- unanimously urged him to restore imperial rule and become emperor.

Since the move went against the spirit of the time and the mood of the public, Yuan's reign as emperor lasted less than six months. Amid growing internal opposition, China began to break up into warlord factions and Yuan Shikai died of natural causes in June 1916, deserted by his lieutenants.

That is a fate which Mr. Jiang risks repeating if he and his allies manipulate delegates at this fall's party congress in order to feed his misguided ambition to cling to power. This will sabotage China's first serious attempt to end octogenarian politics, a system that has caused
untold suffering for Chinese people in recent decades. It will also make all other talk of political reform meaningless if China cannot even put in place an institutionalized structure for transferring power from one leader to the next.

Even if Mr. Jiang only continues as chairman of the Central Military Commission, while agreeing to give up his post as head of the party, as recommended by his friends in the military, this will still have negative consequences. It will reverse the traditional principle of placing the
military under the party's absolute control, so making the military more powerful and sowing the seeds for chaos.

In the last century, Chinese people stood up and rebelled against Yuan's move to turn back the clock and restore an emperorship to China. Today, if Mr. Jiang tries to cling to power and so turn back the clock to rule by octogenarians, he may ultimately end his political career in equal ignominy -- as his actions are equally out of keeping with the spirit of the times.

Mr. Huang is a Chicago-based writer. Mr Chen is a visiting scholar at Harvard University.